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ABSTRACT
By focusing on improving the role of certain mechanisms for
controlling private autonomy under a crisis of liberal values, contract law has reached an objective and straight dimension. The prohibition of disloyal or inconsistent behavior, also known as venire
contra factum proprium in Roman Law, constitutes one of the concepts that is renowned for protecting the trust relationship. The prohibition of disloyal behavior lies in avoiding contradictory behaviors regarding previous manifestations of will that are based on
good faith and that can cause damages. This article aims to challenge the main reason why disloyal behavior should be limited by
good faith in order to promote the legitimate expectations of contractual relationships. This paper first seeks to explain the concepts
related to the limits of disloyal behavior in relation to the grounded
theory of contracts. It then develops a model in which the theory
might be invoked to rectify contradictory conduct. Finally, some
cases heard before the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court and Superior Court of Justice are analyzed to demonstrate how good faith
can also improve contractual due performance in comparative law.
Keywords: Disloyal Behavior, Trust, Good Faith, Contract Law,
Contradicting One’s Own Act, Due Performance, Damages, Loyalty.
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the decline of the political model of liberalism and its values, 1 the basis of contract law has developed an objective dimension, resulting in the reemergence of a number of mechanisms for
controlling private autonomy and will. 2 Among these mechanisms
are duties that are based on Roman Law, the high ethical value of
which underscores the control of contractual rights.
1. Moreover, the idea of freedom of contract has been used as a political
argument in favor of individualism in a laissez faire economy. The case Lochner
v. New York is the main example of that concept, as highlighted by Steven J. Burton in STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 207–208 (2d ed. 2001).
2. Thiago Luís Santos Sombra, Representation and Deliberation: Does
Every Vote Have the Same Influence in the Voting Process of Civil Associations?,
41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. (2015).
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The prohibition on contradicting one’s own behavior, conceived
in the expression venire contra factum proprium, or estoppel in
common law countries, 3 constitutes one of the concepts from Roman Law that is renowned for protecting a commitment to loyalty.
The core of the prohibition of contradicting one’s own behavior,
therefore, lies in avoiding behaviors that conflict with previous manifestations of will. 4
The Roman Law concept of venire contra factum proprium and
estoppel, 5 as mechanisms aimed at protecting trust relationships, are
triggered by two distinct behaviors of the same person: an original
conduct of this person (factum proprium), and a subsequent contradictory behavior, with a difference of timing: so that the interest of
another party relying in good faith on the first conduct may be
harmed by the subsequent conduct. 6 It is, therefore, a mechanism
that was created to discourage disloyalty and promote any other duties attached to good faith.
3. The principle venire contra factum proprium is cited in some cases in the
International Court of Justice; see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J.
3, at 120–21 (Feb. 1969) (separate opinion of Judge Fouad Ammoun). See also
Thiago Luís Santos Sombra, The Interpretation of the Parties’ Conduct, the Uses
and Customs in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods in COMMENTARIES ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), 20 (Silvo de Salvo
Venosa & Rafael Gagliardi eds., 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2623247
(last visited Oct 23, 2015).
4. Martijn. W. Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith in TOWARDS A
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 619-620 (3rd ed., Arthur S. Hartkamp, Ewoud H. Hondius
& Martinjn W. Hesselink eds, 2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1098856; HANS-BERND SCHÄFER & CLAUS OTT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
CIVIL LAW 384 (Matthew Braham trans., 2004).
5. BASIL MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE
GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 123 (2d ed. 2006).
6. Zimmermann highlights that:
going against one’s own previous conduct (venire contra factum proprium) is frowned upon, and so is relying on a right which has been dishonestly acquired (nemo auditur turpitudinem suam allegans), demanding something which has to be given back immediately (dolo agit qui
petit quod statim redditurus est), proceeding ruthlessly and without due
consideration to the reasonable interests of the other party (inciviliter agere), or reacting in a way which must be considered as excessive when
compared with the event occasioning the reaction (Übermaβverbot).
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN & SIMON WHITTAKER, GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 24–25 (2000).
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Notably, the prohibition of inconsistent behavior is not an abstract prohibition on contradictory behaviors; rather, it provides only
a barrier to behaviors that reflect inconsistent positions under good
faith. Because contradiction is an inherent human characteristic and
is also inherent in the dynamics of modern social relations, only inconsistencies that affect another party’s patrimonial sphere through
the inobservance of objective good faith (as will be explained next 7)
can be prohibited.
Nevertheless, venire contra factum proprium should not be
viewed from the perspective of an unlimited incentive for consistency in human behavior because, in principle, incipient behaviors have no legal consequences. 8 Strictly speaking, something has
a legal effect only with the emergence of a contradictory position
subsequent to the first act that is based on good faith.
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, 9 therefore, should not be
inferred as an expression of caprice for excessive coherence or strict
reason. In fact, the typical dynamic nature of mass societies demonstrates the invariable concept that wellbeing lies in the freedom to
change one’s positions when facing the new and unknown. Faced
with this reality, the comprehension of a modern and suitable venire
contra factum proprium pervades any attempt to curb the excessive
manifestation of inconsistent behaviors that harm others, however,
without implying a disproportional limitation on the exercise of individual rights. Thus, both estoppel and venire contra factum proprium reinforce the idea that legal relationships are centered on reliance, loyalty, and the fulfillment of one’s expectations.

7. The concept and distinction between objective and subjective good faith
in civil law systems will be explained in the next section.
8. See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND
173 (2014) (explaining that this feature is called cognitive dissonance, which refers to the human ability to hold contradictory beliefs and values).
9. It is important to highlight that the term disloyal behavior is used with the
same meaning as contradictory behavior in this context. Indeed, disloyalty
represents the origin of contradictory behavior.
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II. PREMISE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE THEORY OF DISLOYAL
BEHAVIOR
A. Definitions
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, or venire contra factum
proprium, constitutes a legal premise that is derived from the idea
of trust and, therefore, from the perspective of good faith, 10 which
considers any objectively contradictory intention in relation to previously manifested conduct to be unacceptable. 11 Strictly speaking,
the prohibition of disloyal behavior comprises not only the annulment of performed acts but also the rejection of their predictable and
desired consequences. 12 It is, therefore, a reasonable mechanism to
limit the exercise of individual rights. 13
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, or venire contra factum
proprium, 14 is justified as the protection of legitimate expectations,
which is used as the element that accords this legal premise axiological content in order to only prevent inconsistent behaviors that
breach an assumption of trust. 15 Nevertheless, it is not an inconsistency or a contradiction that the prohibition of disloyal behavior
aims to prevent, but behavior that would result in an unreasonable
interference with a legitimately created trust relationship, that allowed the other party to reasonably rely on the original conduct. 16
10. ANTÓNIO M.R. MENEZES CORDEIRO, DA BOA-FÉ NO DIREITO CIVIL 753
(2001).
11. ALEJANDRO BORDA, LA TEORÍA DE LOS ACTOS PROPIOS 53 (3d ed. 2000).
12. For Antônio Junqueira de Azevedo, “the expression venire contra factum
proprium underpins the exercise of a legal position in contradiction with a previously adopted behavior; there is a violation of good faith as it violates the expectations created—to all parties, but especially to the party at odds.” ANTONIO
JUNQUEIRA DE AZEVEDO, ESTUDOS E PARECERES DE DIREITO PRIVADO 167
(2004).
13. LUIS DÍEZ-PICAZO, LA DOCTRINA DE LOS PROPIOS ACTOS 186 (1963). Individual rights are understood as a category of protected interests that were received from the law the instruments to repeal any attempt of violation as stated in
MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, AND JOHNSTON, supra note 5 at 124–125.
14. BORDA, supra note 11 at 53.
15. Paulo Mota Pinto, Sobre a Proibição do Comportamento Contraditório
(Venire Contra Factum Proprium) no Direito Civil, VOLUME COMEMORATIVO
BOLETIM FACULDADE DIREITO UNIVERSIDADE COIMBRA 269–322 (2003).
16. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 750.
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The valuable restructuring of venire contra factum proprium lies
exactly in the attempt to solidify good faith. The prohibition of disloyal behavior is reinvigorated by the endeavor to improve it as a
paradigm for concreteness when faced with behaviors that contradict good faith. The provision of venire contra factum proprium
should, however, receive an accurate, systematic study to avoid its
substantial deterioration by overuse and abuse by claimants, which
would result in the trivialization of the mechanism and the exhaustion of the normative content of good faith. Thus, it should be used
to corroborate the path of the adopted argumentation. 17
In this way, venire contra factum proprium, as a category of contradictory acts, will be apt to be functionally invoked both actively
and defensively. For example, it can be invoked as an action to affirm the existence of a right, including but not limited to, the right
to damages, as a substantial exception of illegality, or as a means of
defense of a legal position or situation that is presented as undeniable. 18
As the basis for venire contra factum proprium, the protection
of legitimate expectations should be the dispositive factor in identifying the disloyal behaviors that are relevant 19—that is, the requirement of trust does not refer to a simple and strict obligation of coherence or truth. 20 Moreover, venire contra factum proprium is a
mechanism that focuses on the protection of legitimate expectations,
not a mechanism for the mere prohibition of bad faith or deceit. 21
17. ANDERSON SCHREIBER, A PROIBIÇÃO DE COMPORTAMENTO
CONTRADITÓRIO: TUTELA DA CONFIANÇA E VENIRE CONTRA FACTUM PROPIUM
121–122 (2012).
18. Judith H. Martins-Costa, A Ilicitude Derivada do Exercício Contraditório
de um Direito: o Renascer do Venire Contra Factum Proprium, 97 REVISTA DA
AJURIS 143, 145 (2005).
19. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 123.
20. Menezes Cordeiro stated that when the idea of venire contra factum proprium is taken to its ultimate consequences: “the normative permissions would be
extinguished in the first exercise and the whole social relationship would be converted into a rigid structure of undeniable obligations.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10,
at 751.
21. RUY ROSADO DE AGUIAR JÚNIOR, EXTINÇÃO DOS CONTRATOS POR
INCUMPRIMENTO DO DEVEDOR 254 (1991).
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The identification of trust and good faith as normative bases for
venire contra factum proprium represents a highly favorable measure for the consolidation of the prohibition of disloyal behavior. It
implies the inclusion of dogmatic and axiological aspects that are
already aggregated by good faith. 22 One of the most significant characteristics of good faith expressed by the conception of venire contra factum proprium is its use as a general principle. 23
The general principle of good faith comprises of both objective
and subjective good faith. 24 Objective good faith (for civil law systems) or just fair dealings (for common law systems) comprises of
the belief and trust in the loyalty, in which a given subject will satisfy the legitimate expectations created in someone else. 25 As the
prohibition of disloyal behavior bars any objectively considered inconsistent conduct, it is irrefutable that such conduct should specifically affect good faith. 26 The prohibition of disloyal behavior follows pari passu the axiological content attributed to good faith. For

22. In fact, “bringing venire contra factum proprium to the doctrine of trust
reveals a higher status of ascending duties, of systematization of the casuistry
around contradictory behaviors, and of descending with the concretization of good
faith.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 755.
23. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 621.
24. Martijn Hesselink outlines that the English common law does not accept
the concept of objective good faith as the European continental system and civil
law countries do. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 619. Nonetheless, Teubner notes the
“legal transplant” of good faith to the British by the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulation 1994 (EC Council Directive 93/13/EEC) caused a great deal
of irritation. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergencies, 61 MOD. LAW REV. 11, 11–12
(1998). Zimmerman quotes the case Chapman v. Honig [1963] 2 QB 502 (Eng.)
to confirm the premise that English law does not recognize the effect of good faith
in contract law. According to him, “the relationship between English law’s exclusion of any general requirement of good faith in the performance of contract and
its more general denial of a theory of the abuse of rights perhaps reflects its traditionally wide, liberal approach to the concept of a right itself.” ZIMMERMANN &
WHITTAKER, supra note 6, at 41. Steven J. Burton has also mentioned the difficulties of understanding good faith in the Uniform Commercial Code. Steven J.
Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract within Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1981).
25. STEFANO RODOTÀ, LE FONTI DI INTEGRAZIONE DEL CONTRATTO 149
(2004). For an economic approach related to the costs of protecting trust and good
faith, see SCHÄFER AND OTT, supra note 4 at 375.
26. BORDA, supra note 11, at 60.
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example, the connection between both is interrelated to the point
where one finds its ontological foundations in the other. 27
On the other hand, subjective good faith consists of a belief arising from an excusable mistake that certain conduct does not contradict a given right. 28 It is a concept that is not very familiar in common law countries and that encompasses a two-pronged analysis: a
belief or ignorance about not causing harm to another person’s interests that are protected by the law and the mistake of an agent in a
given factual situation to that person’s benefit. 29
Notwithstanding these aspects, it is important to note the remarks of Menezes Cordeiro in the sense that this is not only the invocation of a certain mechanism over others, but rather it is also an
effective relation of its relevant elements. 30 In other words, we
should aim to raise good faith to the condition of a general principle
that is autonomous, abstract, and subject to being invoked for a variety of legal relations, but with consideration of the peculiar aspects
of each case. 31
Conversely, the prohibition of disloyal behavior, on the other
side of the dichotomy of the principle of good faith, illustrates and
embodies some conditions of the normative coverage attributed to
this general duty; 32 however, venire contra factum proprium has its
limitations.33 The discussion would be of lesser importance if the
application of the general duty of good faith was something pacific,
27. JUDITH H. MARTINS-COSTA, A BOA FÉ NO DIREITO PRIVADO: SISTEMA E
TÓPICA NO PROCESSO OBRIGACIONAL 471 (1999); ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER,
supra note 6, at 30.
28. PETER A. ALCES, A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS
AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 77 (2011).
29. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 136.
30. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 756.
31. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 12, at 120–121 (explaining how codes stay up to date).
32. See FRANZ WIECKER, HISTÓRIA DO DIREITO PRIVADO MODERNO 545–
546 (2d ed., António M. Botelho Hespanha trans. 1967).
33. ANDERSON SCHREIBER, A PROIBIÇÃO DE COMPORTAMENTO
CONTRADITÓRIO: TUTELA DA CONFIANÇA E VENIRE CONTRA FACTUM PROPIUM
99 (2012) (highlighting the evolution of good faith as an open clause in the German Civil Code).
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technical, and straightforward within Brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence and in other countries. 34 We should note, for example, that
the applicability of the general duty of good faith in public law is
still subject to some controversy, as is the framing of its essential
core in extra-contractual, pre-contractual, and even post-contractual
relations. 35
B. Distinction Between the Prohibition of Disloyal Behavior and
Other Similar Categories that Stem from Good Faith
With these considerations noted in relation to the concept, legal
nature, and foundations of venire contra factum proprium, it is imperative to analyze some of the norms that bear similarities to the
prohibition of disloyal behavior. The following distinctions will aim
to anchor the theoretical limits of venire contra factum proprium,
without, however, implying an absence of complementarity or even
an imagined casuistic overlap of the norms.
The real intention here is to highlight the necessity of a full comprehension of the applicable criteria of each norm in order to contemplate, in concreto, the best conditions for resolving a controversy
under the perspective of the legal order.
1. Implied Waiver in Civil Law Systems
Given the influence of liberalism, venire contra factum proprium is commonly confused with the norm of implied waiver. 36 To
the followers of voluntarism, it is more convenient to associate initially-adopted conduct with an implied declaration of will through

34. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 621; ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, supra note
6, at 8. According to Zimmermann, “[p]rivate law in Europe is in the process of
reacquiring a genuinely European character.”
35. Article 422 of the 2002 Civil Code considerably eased the alleged controversies around the time frame of the observance of good faith. Furthermore,
the thesis of Menezes Cordeiro on guilt post factum finitum should also be considered. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 626; THIAGO LUÍS SANTOS SOMBRA,
ADIMPLEMENTO CONTRATUAL E COOPERAÇÃO DO CREDOR 89 (2011).
36. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 149–150.
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which one renounces the exercise of the rights to be obtained in contradiction of that will, rather than finding non-voluntarist grounds to
restrict individual freedom. 37
The fallacy of the syllogism constructed by voluntarists lies in
always considering the facta proprium of an implied declaration of
will when, in fact, this is not the rule. 38 Furthermore, venire contra
factum proprium is marked by its objective character that does not
restrict the scope of legal acts. 39 In refuting this argument, the prohibition on disloyal behavior is independent from the will of whoever practices the inconsistent act. In fact, a contradiction in violation of the expectations rightfully derived from the initial conduct is
sufficient for its existence. 40
Given this explanation, it is worth noting that part of the hypotheses regarding the application of the prohibition of disloyal behavior
is not subject to characterization as an implied waiver or an implied
declaration of will because the factum proprium does not require an
intention, even if presumed, to achieve specific legal effects. 41 It is
not always possible to understand initial conduct and the implied
waiver to exercise a given right, or even as trying to restrict legitimate expectations to implied declarations of will.
Unless the intuitive analysis of Brazilian jurisprudence leads to
the understanding that venire contra factum proprium has been invoked to resolve controversies where implied waiver does not provide clear answers, each mechanism must be conceived according
to its own peculiarities. 42
2. Self-Declared Turpitude
The prohibition of self-declared turpitude derives from the
maxim nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans and presents
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 162.
DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 159.
MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 125.
SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 163.
BORDA, supra note 11, at 133–134.
Hesselink, supra note 4, at 623.
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elements that are very similar to those of venire contra factum proprium. 43
Under the influence of liberalism, article 104 of the 1916 Brazilian Civil Code states that “[w]here there is intent to harm a third
party or violate a legal provision, the contracting parties are forbidden to make pleas or allegations before the court related to misrepresentation [though it seems the article is addressing simulation,
misrepresentation seems to be a good translation here] in actions between the parties or before third parties.” Strictly speaking, whoever
has benefited from their own turpitude cannot plead it with the intention of causing damage to others, as the guilt inherent in this conduct has completely extinguished the conflicting intention. The discovery of fraudulent conduct prevails over any other analysis of the
inconsistent nature of the posterior act because, in fact, the fraudulent conduct has occurred only because of the initial malicious intent.
The resemblance between the legal mechanisms is seen in the
attempt to prevent the practice of a posterior act in contradiction to
a previous one. The difference, however, lies in the circumstances
in which, in the case of self-declared turpitude, the initial conduct is
marked by malice, whereas in venire contra factum proprium, it is
independent of the subjective elements. The application of the prohibition of disloyal behavior only requires the characterization of an
objective contradictory situation. For example, the underlying willful element is in conflict with the actual facts supporting it.
3. Mental Reservation
What is commonly known as mental reservation (article 110 of
the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code) occurs when one party hides their

43. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 667–668 (1996) (explaining the different meanings of dolo and self-declared turpitude).
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real intention when manifesting their will with the objective of causing damage to someone. 44 It is a type of simulation. The difference
between them in the Brazilian Civil Code is that mental reservation
depends on the bad faith of only one person, whereas simulation requires the bad faith of at least two people. Therefore, the previously
declared manifestation of will persists even if the author has made a
mental reservation of not wanting what he or she has actually manifested, unless the other party was aware of that fact. 45
In fact, mental reservation contains aspects that are very similar
to those of self-declared turpitude, such that the arguments used to
distinguish it from the prohibition of disloyal behavior are also valid
here.
4. Tu Quoque
The expression tu quoque originated from the dialogue between
Emperor Julius Caesar and Marcus Junius Brutus when the latter
stabbed the former: “tu quoque, Brutus, tu quoque, mi fili?” 46 In its
literal translation, tu quoque means “even you” and denotes a feeling
of surprise mixed with disappointment for inconsistent behavior. 47
Thus, how is it possible that even you (tu quoque), who engaged in
acts that created a well-grounded and legitimate expectation in
someone else, now come to dishonor what you had previously committed to do? Tu quoque is a term that is invoked to express that no

44. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 163; MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 27, at 66;
AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 35.
45. MÁRIO JÚLIO DE ALMEIDA COSTA, DIREITO DAS OBRIGAÇÕES 320
(2000); LUÍS M. T. MENEZES LEITÃO, II DIREITO DAS OBRIGAÇÕES 76 (2003);
MANUALE DI DIRITTO CIVILE at 110 (6th ed., Pietro Perlingieiri org. 2007).
46. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, GEGENSEITIGE VERTRAGSUNTREUE:
RECHTSPRECHUNG U. DOGMATIK Z. AUSSCHLUSS VON RECHTEN NACH EIGENEM
VERTRAGSBRUCH 10–25 (1975). In Portugal, Germany, and Brazil, the expression
tu quoque is well known and is employed to refer to behaviors that represent an
undesirable surprise for the other party.
47. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 837; EGON LORENZ, DER TU-QUOQUEEINWAND BEIM RÜCKTRITT DER SELBST VERTRAGSUNTREUEN PARTEI WEGEN
VERTRAGSVERLETZUNG DES GEGNERS 312 (1972).
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one who violates a norm can obtain benefits that stem from one’s
own disloyal behavior. 48
Although the expression tu quoque is employed in philosophy
and rhetoric as an argument of a fallacious nature or of an inconsistent thesis, from a legal perspective, the term consolidates different evaluative criteria for substantially identical situations. 49
When comparing tu quoque and venire contra factum proprium,
one can notice a markedly similar factor identified by a contradiction observed in a given conduct. However, the difference between
tu quoque and venire contra factum proprium, is associated with
preventing the coexistence of different valuation criteria for objectively similar situations. In other words, the repulsion of disloyalty
and malice seems to stand out more incisively in tu quoque than in
venire contra factum proprium.
5. Suppressio and Surrectio
The mechanism of suppressio, which is most known for its similarity to Verwirkung, can be understood as the inertia of the party
entitled to a right to exert it after a given time lapse, making it impossible to claim it again later under penalty of a violation of the
principle of good faith. 50 Thus, while prescription protects an intention only for the passage of time, for suppressio to be recognized,
one is required to demonstrate that such behavior is unacceptable
under the principle of good faith. 51
Notably, suppressio is not the deprivation of the ability to exert
a right simply as a result of the passage of time. In fact, the controversy involves the non-observance of good faith by someone who
has instilled in another person the legitimate expectation that a right
that had been neglected until then would no longer be exercised. 52
48. Id. at 840.; ANTÓNIO MENEZES CORDEIRO,
PORTUGUÊS (2d ed. 2007).
49. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 175.
50. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 798–800.
51. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 254.
52. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 812.
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Therefore, in cases of contracts of successive performance or installments, when the creditor has failed to act in a timely manner on a
certain requirement as a result of a lack of initiative, he is prevented
from taking another position on that issue “if the debtor had reason
to believe that the obligation had been extinguished and has planned
their life under that perspective.” 53
Surrectio represents the other side of suppressio—that is, the
emergence of a right due to the repeated practice of certain acts. As
an illustration, Ruy Rosado de Aguiar Junior evokes the hypothesis
of the distribution of profits in a commercial association, in clear
violation of statutes, which would engender the right to continue to
receive such distributions. 54
6. Estoppel in Common Law
Etymologically, the term estoppel means barrier, obstacle, or
impediment. Originally a procedural common law mechanism, it developed into a rule of substance that maintains significant proximity
to the prohibition of disloyal behavior in Roman Law. 55
The reason why the alluded resemblance between the two is
commonly evoked is because estoppel appeared during the Middle
Ages at a time when Roman Canon Law exerted a considerable degree of influence on the English lawmakers. In addition, the use of
estoppel is frequently associated with the expression own act.
Although both mechanisms are applied with the objective of preventing contradictory behaviors, it is imperative to note that they
developed with the idiosyncrasies of their respective legal order. 56

53. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 254.
54. Id. at 255.
55. Borda affirms that some authors restrict the application of estoppel to the
procedural scope as a means of defense against a party who has practiced or failed
to practice a procedural act. BORDA, supra note 11, at 28. We thus verify a relative
resemblance between this line of thought and the concept of logical preclusion as
established in the Brazilian legal order. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 180.
56. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 72.
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The concept of estoppel is related to the protection of the practice of an initial behavior that results from a legitimate expectation
that such practice conforms with good faith. 57 The main peculiarity
of estoppel in common law is related to the creation of a presumption jure et de jure, an irrebuttable presumption that prevents a person from affirming or denying the existence of a given right for having engaged in a certain act or having made a positive or negative
statement in the opposite sense. 58 Consequently, it is possible to
conclude that estoppel is aimed at objectively protecting the practice
because it safeguards the good faith and trust generated by an unequivocal conduct.
Estoppel is traditionally applied as a defense rather than a cause
of action, though there are exceptions, particularly in the United
States (promissory estoppel). It cannot be applied ex officio by a
judge. The prohibition of disloyal behavior, in contrast, can be applied as both a defensive protection and a cause of action, as well as
in a way that can be enforced ex officio or if provoked. 59
7. Verwirkung in German Law
Verwirkung can be understood as a significantly similar mechanism to venire contra factum proprium and is mainly based on the
analysis of historical events marked by the assimilation of Roman
Law by the Germanic peoples. Note that this affirmation implies no
intention to attribute a position of superiority of Verwirkung over
venire contra factum proprium.
Verwirkung strongly connects with the doctrine of abuse of
rights, as it seeks to prevent the delayed exercise of a right. 60 Verwirkung applies when the beneficiary of a right did not exercise it at
the proper time, which provides the other party with the legitimate

57.
58.
59.
60.

MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 132.
BORDA, supra note 11, at 25.
DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 69.
MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 124.
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expectation that the right was waived, independently of the existence of a will to do so. 61 Verwirkung, therefore, aims at preventing
conduct that is engaged in unexpectedly, after a considerable period
of inertia, because such a posture would challenge the assumptions
of good faith. 62
Moreover, we should note that Verwirkung can also be applied
to extend certain deadlines so as to allow the exercise of a prescribed
or expired interest.
8. Duty to Mitigate Loss
The duty to mitigate loss imposed on the creditor of damages
originates in the common law. Like venire contra factum proprium,
the duty to mitigate loss has been subject to a significantly unsystematic normative approach, especially when we observe its development in Germany, Switzerland, and France.
Strictly speaking, the duty of a creditor to mitigate the loss
caused by the debtor finds broad acceptance in international conventions such as Article 77 of the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods; the Hague Convention of July
1st, 1964, relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (Corporeal Movables); the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, published in Rome in 1994; the Principles of European Contract Law;
and the lex mercatoria.
The duty to mitigate loss is not an obligation in the strict sense,
and this is the reason why it must be called a duty. There is no liability in case of non-performance. German law gives the duty to mitigate loss the legal nature of Obliegenheit, 63 which is a less im-

61. BORDA, supra note 11, at 103.
62. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 180.
63. Clóvis V. do Couto e Silva, A Obrigação como Processo 112–113 (1976).
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portant duty that only results in the loss of a favorable legal position. 64 By contrast, in Switzerland, the legal nature of the mechanism is equated to an incombance. 65 As such, the creditor’s duty is
more clearly noted as a claimable obligation.
As it has been suggested, French jurisprudence may link the duty
to mitigate loss with the requirement of good faith and the doctrine
of abuse of rights, coming very close to venire contra factum proprium. 66
As stated by Vera Maria Jacob de Fradera, 67 French jurisprudence uses venire contra factum proprium as a justification to impute to the creditor a sanction derived from l’obligation de mitigation. To illustrate this, it is worth mentioning Bailleux v Jaretty. 68 In
this case, a landlord did not charge a full-year rent for eleven years
and when he invoked a termination clause, he was prevented from
exerting his right based on the requirement of good faith. This may
be described as an application of venire contra factum proprium.
After the promulgation of the 2002 Civil Code, which expressed
for the first time the principle of good faith, the duty to mitigate loss
could be identified within the Brazilian legal order as a duty that
attaches to the general duty of good faith. 69 Notwithstanding this
relevant foundation of validity for the application of the duty to mitigate loss, we could also consider it as an abuse of rights, which is
acknowledged as a type of unlawful act. 70
Having established the premises for an accurate understanding
of the duty to mitigate loss, it is important to remember that with the
example of defaulting on a payment obligation, creditors must accept their responsibility and proceed with the required measures to

64. Christoph Fabian, O Dever de Informar no Direito Civil 53 (2002).
65. Silva, supra note 63 at 112–113.
66. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 174.
67. Id.
68. Cass. Com., January 7, 1963, Bull. III, no. 16, p. 14.
69. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 121.
70. In Germany, the abuse of rights was viewed as some sort of violation of
the principle of good faith. See ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, supra note 6.
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attempt to minimize their loss, or as it is premised in res perit domino, the creditors must bear the economic consequences of their inertia.
Hence, by failing to mitigate his or her own loss, “the creditor
may be subject to sanctions, either based on the prohibition of venire
contra factum proprium, or for incurring an abuse of right.” 71 This
is caused by the non-observance of a duty attached to the requirement of good faith.
III. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF LOYALTY BASED
ON GOOD FAITH
Because the fundamental scope of venire contra factum proprium is related to the protection of legitimate expectations, all of
the criteria for its application should reflect this objective. 72 Although the prohibition of disloyal behavior has essentially been associated with protecting consistent behaviors or their consideration
per se, such an understanding should not prevail over the new perspective of protecting legitimate expectations.
A. One’s Own Act as the Starting Point
The first criterion for invoking the prohibition of disloyal behavior is the existence of two legal behaviors by the same person at
different points in time. The first of these behaviors can be identified
as the factum proprium. 73 However, the factum proprium cannot be
classified from the beginning as a legal act 74 because, in principle,
the initial behavior does not have any legal meaning, i.e., it is not
legally binding in nature. 75 Moreover, this aspect arises from the

71. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 177.
72. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 193.
73. Id. at 194.
74. This is an opportune time to invoke the lessons of Menezes Cordeiro, who
states that “the broad scope in which venire contra factum proprium may be encompassed requires prior delimitation, even if empirical and provisional, of the
figurative reach of the mechanism.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 746.
75. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 126.
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reasonable conclusion that if a behavior is already binding under the
terms of a positive right—because the law so declares or because the
legal requisites are fulfilled to qualify it as a legal act—it is not necessary to invoke trust or reliance to impose the duty of maintaining
that behavior’s objective meaning. 76
Moreover, if a norm that gives effect to the act exists within the
legal order to make it binding, any breach of the alleged provision
will be subject to rules of civil accountability (contractual or extracontractual). 77 The consistency embodied by the protection of legitimate expectations in the alleged hypothesis is an irrelevant factor,
considering the legal effects arising from the act taken in contradiction to the initial position. 78
Thus, we should not forget that the factum proprium is generally
a non-binding act that becomes binding because it creates legitimate
reliance 79 in someone else and, therefore, subjects the previous behavior to venire contra factum proprium. 80
Invoking the rule of the prohibition of disloyal behavior is unnecessary whenever the non-fulfillment of obligations deriving from
a legal relationship receives due sanction from other legal orders,
such as in cases involving mandatory responsibility. 81
Therefore, venire contra factum proprium can be identified in
two general hypotheses: i) when a person manifests an intention to
not engage in a certain act and then engages in the act; and ii) when
a person declares their intention to engage in a certain act and then
refuses to do so. 82

76. Id. at 126–127.
77. Pinto, supra note 15, at 166.
78. For Schreiber, the law exempts the requirement of trust in coherent conduct, “as the inconsistent behavior will have violated a conduct that positive law
itself already determines as binding.” SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 126.
79. BORDA, supra note 11, at 69.
80. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 195–196.
81. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 746.
82. Id. at 747.
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Thus, the factum proprium should be considered neither legally
relevant nor effective 83 unless it generates some effects regarding
the incoherence of the previous conduct in contradiction to good
faith, as defined earlier. 84
It is very important to clarify that not all factum proprium should
be identified as binding conduct 85 because the development of the
prohibition of disloyal behavior does not have the objective of causing excessive legal security; rather, it only protects the legitimate
expectations arising from social relations, independent of the existence of legal norms between the parties. 86
B. General Principles for Protecting Legitimate Expectations
The prohibition of disloyal behavior is a rule derived from the
general principle of good faith. 87 It is a principle that advocates the
duty of loyalty, 88 liability, cooperation, and satisfaction of others’
expectations 89 in the fulfillment of their obligations. 90 This led

83. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 201.
84. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 129–130.
85. “The person manifesting the intention of practicing a certain act but who
is not committed to doing so normally creates the expectation of a nonexistent or
invalid deal.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 745.
86. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 43, at 636–637.
87. See SOMBRA, supra note 35 at 20; ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION 6 (1984). For Stefano Rodotà, good faith acts as a functional
tool to improve cooperation in contract performance. RODOTÀ, supra note25, at
150.
88. See C. MASSIMO BIANCA, 3 DIRITTO CIVILE: IL CONTRATTO 422–423 (2d
ed. 2000) (underlining that the duty of liability imposes an obligation to not cause
unreasonable surprise).
89. TERESA NEGREIROS, FUNDAMENTOS PARA UMA INTERPRETAÇÃO
CONSTITUCIONAL DO PRINCÍPIO DA BOA-FÉ 238 (1998). Moreover, it is worth noting the reference made by the author on the judgment of the tomato sauce industry,
which distributed seeds to several farmers and, after the harvest, failed to acquire
the harvested crops. For more, see MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 27, at 473–474.
90. For Judith Martins-Costa:
if there is no protection of fair expectations, it is because legal acts are
social acts, and as such, they commonly affect, either directly or indirectly, the lives of our partners and third parties. This is the reason why
a serious and well-grounded evaluation of the trust we arouse in others
is imperative.
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Clóvis do Couto e Silva to affirm that “the duties derived from good
faith are, thus, arranged in degrees of intensity, depending on the
category of the legal acts attached to them.” 91 As reported by Reinhard Zimmermann and Judith Martins-Costa, for a long time, the
instruments controlling the exercise of subjective rights were restricted to exceptio doli and to the abuse of rights. 92
The principle of good faith, which was expressly adopted in the
2002 Brazilian Civil Code, limits the exercise of subjective rights. 93
However, the presence of elements of subjective good faith in venire
contra factum proprium cannot be ignored, especially when the belief is considered to arise from the initial behavior. 94 The initial expectation is maintained only if the personal perspective of the receiving agent is favorable.
Despite the considerations established regarding subjective
good faith, note that good faith constitutes the primordial foundation
for invoking the prohibition of disloyal behavior because of two factors 95: i) the conduct that is objectively considered inconsistent; and

Judith Martins-Costa, A Ilicitude Derivada do Exercício Contraditório de um
Direito: O Renascer do Venire Contra Factum Proprium, 32 REVISTA DA AJURIS
168 (2005).
91. Silva, supra note 63, at 31.
92. Martins-Costa, supra note 18, at 455. Zimmermann draws an insightful
comparison when explaining that:
comparative studies normally focus on specific subject matters, problem
areas and real life situations, or on relatively well-defined legal institutions like mistake, agency or stipulation alteri. Good faith fits into neither
of these categories. At the same time, however, it is as least in some legal
systems regarded as a vitally important ingredient for a modern general
law of contract.
ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, supra note 6, at 12–13, 16.
93. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 141.
94. Id. at 209.
95. Hesselink explains that:
the process of concretization has not been totally identical in all countries. Whereas in Germany and in the Netherlands legal doctrine rather
reacts to court decisions and tries to regroup them, and thus they build
up a system (a rather more inductive approach), French and Italian legal
doctrine seem to follow the more deductive approach of asking themselves what, in theory, the content of the duty of good faith, or the good
faith standard could be, and thus they build up a system of sub-duties et
cetera, in which the legal decisions are given their place at a later stage,
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ii) the assumption of good faith by the person adversely affected by
the disloyal behavior. 96
C. Unraveling the Contradiction from One’s Own Act
In order for the prohibition of inconsistent behavior to be correctly invoked, first, the presence of a posterior conduct to the factum proprium, which encompasses the exercise of an intention
grounded in a subjective right 97 that will consequently generate a
conflict of interests, must be identified.
The inconsistent conduct required for the application of venire
contra factum proprium is comprised of two different distinctions.
First, it requires the performance of a new act, and this act must then
embody the pretention of exercising a subjective right. 98 In the absence of the first act, the second one would obviously be legally
valid and effective. It only becomes illegitimate when faced with the
previously manifested conduct. 99
The second act, considered isolatedly, does not have any legal
relevance for the prohibition of inconsistency. It only becomes relevant when contrasted with the previous behavior that generated the
reliance of the other party. 100 Actually, the first act becomes binding
only after the posterior contradictory intention is manifested.
The contradictory posterior intention evokes the exercise of a
completely acceptable right if it were in another context, and it only
becomes inadmissible after a timespan associated with the objective
violation of the duty of coherence and loyalty. The exercise of a
subjective right, therefore, appears as an element of fundamental importance to verify whether the posterior conduct is acceptable.

the Italian authors thereby relying heavily on the achievements of German courts and legal doctrine.
Hesselink, supra note 4, at 625.
96. BORDA, supra note 11, at 61.
97. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 217.
98. Id. at 228–229.
99. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 747–748.
100. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 142.
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The party who was favored by the initial act must obviously be
in good faith. 101 The claimant can invoke the prohibition of disloyal
behavior as a means to protect him or herself from posterior contradictory conduct only if the relationship of trust was also initiated in
conformity with good faith. 102 Thus, it is undeniable that venire contra factum proprium cannot be used as a mechanism to protect a
relationship of trust arising out of bad faith.
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, therefore, arises as an ethical assessment 103 of the initial conduct that legitimately engenders
a relationship of trust guided by good faith. 104
IV. THE PROHIBITION ON DISLOYAL BEHAVIOR IN THE BRAZILIAN
CIVIL CODE
Due to the unquestionable influence of liberalism, the 1916 Civil
Code did not unequivocally contemplate the prohibition of disloyal
behavior. Moreover, as stated above, such a posture highlights an
alignment with the principles of private autonomy that allowed acts
that were purely guided by the unusual manifestations of the will of
the agent, even if that would result in a contradiction with previous
behavior.
The 2002 Civil Code 105 was marked by the adoption of principles of ethics, solidarity, and the objective analysis of legal acts. As
a consequence, legislators were more inclined to prohibit disloyal
behavior and to protect legitimate expectations. The requirement for
coherent behavior being recognized per se in line with the protection
of good faith, venire contra factum proprium began to occupy a
101. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 625.
102. BORDA, supra note 11, at 78.
103. As well argued by Menezes Cordeiro:
venire contra factum proprium, because it is invested with negative ethical, psychological and sociological values, should be mandatorily contrasted with good faith, a concept that bears positive cultural representation and that is, furthermore, contained in the Roman tradition of Corpus
Iuris Civilis in such a state of dilution that makes it omnipresent.
CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 753. See also RODOTÀ, supra note 25, at 131.
104. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 143.
105. For instance, see articles 187 and 421 of the Brazilian Civil Code.
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prominent position in the resolution of conflicts of interest. 106 What
one must bear in mind in considering the application of the provisions of venire contra factum proprium is that whenever coherence
is protected, such protection is based on reasons that go beyond a
requirement of consistency.
A. The Federal Supreme Court’s Understanding
The leading case in Brazil regarding the adoption of the prohibition of disloyal behavior or venire contra factum proprium is Extraordinary Appeal No. 86.787, registered by Justice Rapporteur
Leitão de Abreu. The dispute centered on the divorce of a Brazilian
couple who had been married in Uruguay, in full compliance with
Uruguayan law, under a separation of property regime.
Because the separation of property regime was the legal regime
in Uruguay and was also accepted in Brazil, it could not be impugned by the appellant two years after the marriage and after having represented that he was married under a separation of property
regime in several notarial acts, as clarified by Justice Leitão de
Abreu. 107
After an in-depth analysis of the opinion of Justice Leitão de
Abreu, it is possible to identify two specific factors, namely, the previous conduct of the appellant in conformity with good faith and his
attempt to break a relationship of trust that he had consciously
agreed to and then later tried to deny. Venire contra factum proprium appears, in this case, to be an impediment to the appellant’s
behavior, who, after living under the separation of property regime
for two years, then attempted to adopt another regime.

106. José Gustavo Souza Miranda, A Proteção da Confiança nas Relações
Obrigacionais, 153 REVISTA INFORMAÇÃO LEGISLATIVA 131, 141 (2002).
107. S.T.F.J., RE 86.787/RS, Justice Rapp.: Leitão de Abreu, 20.10.1978 90
R.T.J. 968 (Brazil).
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B. The Development of the Superior Court of Justice’s Interpretation
At the Superior Court of Justice level, the first judgment to expressly adopt the prohibition of disloyal behavior was articulated by
Justice Ruy Rosado de Aguiar. In this case, a married couple who
had agreed to sell property failed to sign a purchase and sale agreement. The buyers were in possession of the property, the sellers acknowledging the validity of the contract. However, after seventeen
years, they refused to provide the property’s final deed. 108
Previously, when deciding Special Appeal No. 37.859, Justice
Ruy Rosado de Aguiar reaffirmed arguments regarding the prohibition of disloyal behavior. He asserted that it was inadmissible for a
party, who requested the issuance of a charter to alienate an encumbered property with an inalienability clause and then refuse to actualize its subrogation:
The party that requests the charter and alienates the encumbered property, having received the price, has the duty to
provide its subrogation, which is still possible, as foreseen
by the law and established in the judgment. It is inadmissible
for the party who benefitted in the process filed under their
request and who breached their duty to actualize the subrogation to obtain, in violation of the prohibition on disloyal
behavior and at the detriment of the party acquiring the property in good faith, the annulment of the alienation simply because, as years have passed, they regret closing the deal. 109
Another important Superior Court of Justice decision on the prohibition of disloyal behavior was rendered by Justice Adhemar
Maciel, who affirmed that “if the alleged mistake in the property
deed was caused by the Administration itself, through a high-ranking official, there is no reason to plead the existence of a vice, at the
risk of causing damage to the party who, in good faith, has paid the

108. S.T.J., REsp 95.539/SP, Justice Rapp.: Ruy Rosado Aguiar 3.9.1996
(Brazil).
109. S.T.J., REsp. 37.859/PR, Justice Rapp.: Ruy Rosado Aguiar, 28.04.1997
(Brazil).
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price established for the acquisition,” 110 without violating the principles nemo potest venire contra factum proprium and memo creditor turpitudinem suam allegans.
In another case related to the signing of a purchase and sale
agreement by a municipality, Justice Ruy Rosado de Aguiar once
again applied the criteria of venire contra factum proprium. He
noted that because the municipality had signed the purchase and sale
agreement for a lot located on its property, the request for annulment
of the act was denied. He also opined that the municipality should
proceed, if possible, with the regularization of the allotment. According to Justice Ruy Rosado, “the prohibition on disloyal behavior
prevents the Public Administration from not following its own procedures, to the detriment of others who have trusted in the consistency of its procedures.”
In another case in which the reporting judge was Justice Antônio
de Pádua Ribeiro, venire contra factum proprium was strongly supported, as stated in the judgment:
[t]he mere circumstance that the Federal Government,
through the Ministry of Health, has bestowed on the defendant laboratory a license for the commercialization of a harmful and disastrous medicine does not create, by itself, a right
of recourse against the National Treasury to the extravagant
claim of the so-called objective responsibility. 111
Therefore, for the reporting Justice, in such cases, the license of
fabrication and commercialization is conferred based on the research data provided by the laboratory itself, and therefore, the right
of recourse would correspond to a case of venire contra factum proprium. 112
The prohibition of disloyal behavior received another endorsement by the Second Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice. The
110. S.T.J., REsp. 47.015/SP, Justice Rapp.: Adhemar Ferreira Maciel,
9.12.1997 (Brazil).
111. S.T.J., REsp. 60.129/SP, Justice Rapp.: Antônio Pádua Ribeiro,
20.09.2004, 185 R.S.T.J. 352 (Brazil).
112. S.T.J., REsp. 60.129/SP, Justice Rapp.: Antônio Pádua Ribeiro,
20.09.2004, 185 R.S.T.J. 352 (Brazil).
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case, headed by Justice Eliana Calmon, referred to the bidding process for a use and exploration license for areas for the new and former passenger terminals of the Pinto Martins – Fortaleza International Airport.
A car park service provider was awarded the bid for the former
passenger terminal. However, after having signed the concession
agreement, the Brazilian Company of Airport Infrastructure
(INFRAERO) discovered that the winning bidder had participated
in the process using false documentation. Consequently,
INFRAERO terminated the contract and invited the second-place
winner to determine whether it was still interested in signing a contract for a period of eight months and nineteen days, which could
eventually be extended for another three years. After the contract
was signed, INFRAERO finished the construction of the new international passenger terminal, which was located far away from the
parking area used by the new winner of the bidding process.
Actually, INFRAERO had forwarded correspondence to the second-place winner of the bidding process with the objective of encouraging it to sign the concession agreement for the remaining period of eight months and nineteen days, when the initial proposal
was for three years. In such correspondence, INFRAERO assured
the second-place winner that the concession agreement would be extended for another three years and that the company would be favored in the bidding process for the new parking area of the international arrivals terminal. After a review request, following Justice
Eliana Calmon, Justice Franciulli Neto delivered his opinion and,
invoked venire contra factum proprium to help solve the controversy. In addition, he noted important considerations regarding the
aspects of said mechanism. 113
Hence, since the first case that was decided by Justice Ruy Rosado, the Superior Court of Justice has provided significant steps

113. S.T.J., REsp 524.811/CE, Justice Rapp.: Eliana Calmon, 14.14.2004
(Brazil).

54

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

toward the construction of a paradigm of venire contra factum proprium in private law. 114
V. CONCLUSION
The theory of disloyal behavior, or venire contra factum proprium, as a mechanism aimed at protecting reliance relationships,
stemmed from good faith and to become an important tool for controlling private autonomy in comparative private law. In general, it
occurs in two distinct behaviors by the same person—one’s own act
(factum proprium) and a contradictory behavior, with a difference
of timing such that the latter represents an incoherence with the good
faith that governs the former. It is, therefore, an expressive tool to
discourage disloyalty and promote any other duties attached to good
faith.
Notably, the prohibition of disloyal behavior does not at all consist of an abstract prohibition on contradictory behaviors; rather, it
only applies to behaviors that reflect inconsistent positions under
good faith. Because contradiction is an inherent human characteristic and is inherent in the dynamics of modern social relations, only
inconsistencies that have a harmful effect on another party’s patrimonial sphere, through the non-observance of good faith, can be
avoided.
Nevertheless, venire contra factum proprium should not be
viewed from the perspective of an unlimited incentive to consistency in human behavior because, in general, many types of be-

114. See Hesselink, supra note 4, at 624 (explaining that “in Germany, scholars both in private law and in jurisprudence have developed methods for rationalizing and objectivating the decisions of the court. The purpose of these Methodenlehren is to render the application of the law in general, and of general clauses like
good faith in particular, as rational and objective (and thereby predictable) as possible, instead of leaving it to the subjective judgment of the individual judge. The
generally agreed method for rationalizing is that of distinguishing functions and
developing groups of cases in which good faith has previously been applied
(Fallgruppen). In doing so, legal doctrine has developed an ‘inner system’ of good
faith, which is regarded as the content of that norm.”).
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haviors have no legal consequences. Strictly speaking, in accordance with the disloyal behavior doctrine, it is feasible to underline
legal effects only when someone faces a contradictory position subsequent to the first act. Nonetheless, what can be observed is that
good faith has been an engine of change in contract law and the law
of obligations in both civil law and common law systems based on
values such as cooperation.

